Complete Yocto mirror with license table for TQMa6UL (2038-compliance)

- 264 license table entries with exact download URLs (224/264 resolved)
- Complete sources/ directory with all BitBake recipes
- Build configuration: tqma6ul-multi-mba6ulx, spaetzle (musl)
- Full traceability for Softwarefreigabeantrag
- GCC 13.4.0, Linux 6.6.102, U-Boot 2023.04, musl 1.2.4
- License distribution: GPL-2.0 (24), MIT (23), GPL-2.0+ (18), BSD-3 (16)

sources/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2024-57254.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 3f9deb424ecd6ecd50f165b42f0b0290d83853f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2024 18:36:45 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/8] squashfs: Fix integer overflow in sqfs_inode_size()
+
+A carefully crafted squashfs filesystem can exhibit an extremly large
+inode size and overflow the calculation in sqfs_inode_size().
+As a consequence, the squashfs driver will read from wrong locations.
+
+Fix by using __builtin_add_overflow() to detect the overflow.
+
+Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Reviewed-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-57254
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/c8e929e5758999933f9e905049ef2bf3fe6b140d]
+Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
+---
+ fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c | 9 +++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c b/fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c
+index d25cfb53..bb3ccd37 100644
+--- a/fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c
++++ b/fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c
+@@ -78,11 +78,16 @@ int sqfs_inode_size(struct squashfs_base_inode *inode, u32 blk_size)
+ 
+ 	case SQFS_SYMLINK_TYPE:
+ 	case SQFS_LSYMLINK_TYPE: {
++		int size;
++
+ 		struct squashfs_symlink_inode *symlink =
+ 			(struct squashfs_symlink_inode *)inode;
+ 
+-		return sizeof(*symlink) +
+-			get_unaligned_le32(&symlink->symlink_size);
++		if (__builtin_add_overflow(sizeof(*symlink),
++		    get_unaligned_le32(&symlink->symlink_size), &size))
++			return -EINVAL;
++
++		return size;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	case SQFS_BLKDEV_TYPE:
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

sources/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2024-57255.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From 5d7ca74388544bf8c95e104517a9120e94bfe40d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2024 18:36:44 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/8] squashfs: Fix integer overflow in sqfs_resolve_symlink()
+
+A carefully crafted squashfs filesystem can exhibit an inode size of 0xffffffff,
+as a consequence malloc() will do a zero allocation.
+Later in the function the inode size is again used for copying data.
+So an attacker can overwrite memory.
+Avoid the overflow by using the __builtin_add_overflow() helper.
+
+Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Reviewed-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-57255
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/233945eba63e24061dffeeaeb7cd6fe985278356]
+Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
+---
+ fs/squashfs/sqfs.c | 10 ++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fs/squashfs/sqfs.c b/fs/squashfs/sqfs.c
+index 1430e671..16a07c06 100644
+--- a/fs/squashfs/sqfs.c
++++ b/fs/squashfs/sqfs.c
+@@ -422,8 +422,10 @@ static char *sqfs_resolve_symlink(struct squashfs_symlink_inode *sym,
+ 	char *resolved, *target;
+ 	u32 sz;
+ 
+-	sz = get_unaligned_le32(&sym->symlink_size);
+-	target = malloc(sz + 1);
++	if (__builtin_add_overflow(get_unaligned_le32(&sym->symlink_size), 1, &sz))
++		return NULL;
++
++	target = malloc(sz);
+ 	if (!target)
+ 		return NULL;
+ 
+@@ -431,9 +433,9 @@ static char *sqfs_resolve_symlink(struct squashfs_symlink_inode *sym,
+ 	 * There is no trailling null byte in the symlink's target path, so a
+ 	 * copy is made and a '\0' is added at its end.
+ 	 */
+-	target[sz] = '\0';
++	target[sz - 1] = '\0';
+ 	/* Get target name (relative path) */
+-	strncpy(target, sym->symlink, sz);
++	strncpy(target, sym->symlink, sz - 1);
+ 
+ 	/* Relative -> absolute path conversion */
+ 	resolved = sqfs_get_abs_path(base_path, target);
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

sources/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2024-57256.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From 49cab731abe7a98db4ac16666e3b5ab3bc799282 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2024 11:54:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/8] ext4: Fix integer overflow in ext4fs_read_symlink()
+
+While zalloc() takes a size_t type, adding 1 to the le32 variable
+will overflow.
+A carefully crafted ext4 filesystem can exhibit an inode size of 0xffffffff
+and as consequence zalloc() will do a zero allocation.
+
+Later in the function the inode size is again used for copying data.
+So an attacker can overwrite memory.
+
+Avoid the overflow by using the __builtin_add_overflow() helper.
+
+Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-57256
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/35f75d2a46e5859138c83a75cd2f4141c5479ab9]
+Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
+---
+ fs/ext4/ext4_common.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4_common.c b/fs/ext4/ext4_common.c
+index f50de7c0..a7798296 100644
+--- a/fs/ext4/ext4_common.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/ext4_common.c
+@@ -2188,13 +2188,18 @@ static char *ext4fs_read_symlink(struct ext2fs_node *node)
+ 	struct ext2fs_node *diro = node;
+ 	int status;
+ 	loff_t actread;
++	size_t alloc_size;
+ 
+ 	if (!diro->inode_read) {
+ 		status = ext4fs_read_inode(diro->data, diro->ino, &diro->inode);
+ 		if (status == 0)
+ 			return NULL;
+ 	}
+-	symlink = zalloc(le32_to_cpu(diro->inode.size) + 1);
++
++	if (__builtin_add_overflow(le32_to_cpu(diro->inode.size), 1, &alloc_size))
++		return NULL;
++
++	symlink = zalloc(alloc_size);
+ 	if (!symlink)
+ 		return NULL;
+ 
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

sources/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2024-57257.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+From 4eb527c473068953f90ea65b33046a25140e0a89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2024 18:36:47 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 4/8] squashfs: Fix stack overflow while symlink resolving
+
+The squashfs driver blindly follows symlinks, and calls sqfs_size()
+recursively. So an attacker can create a crafted filesystem and with
+a deep enough nesting level a stack overflow can be achieved.
+
+Fix by limiting the nesting level to 8.
+
+Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Reviewed-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-57257
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/4f5cc096bfd0a591f8a11e86999e3d90a9484c34]
+Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
+---
+ fs/squashfs/sqfs.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fs/squashfs/sqfs.c b/fs/squashfs/sqfs.c
+index 16a07c06..a5b7890e 100644
+--- a/fs/squashfs/sqfs.c
++++ b/fs/squashfs/sqfs.c
+@@ -24,7 +24,12 @@
+ #include "sqfs_filesystem.h"
+ #include "sqfs_utils.h"
+ 
++#define MAX_SYMLINK_NEST 8
++
+ static struct squashfs_ctxt ctxt;
++static int symlinknest;
++
++static int sqfs_readdir_nest(struct fs_dir_stream *fs_dirs, struct fs_dirent **dentp);
+ 
+ static int sqfs_disk_read(__u32 block, __u32 nr_blocks, void *buf)
+ {
+@@ -508,7 +513,7 @@ static int sqfs_search_dir(struct squashfs_dir_stream *dirs, char **token_list,
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		while (!sqfs_readdir(dirsp, &dent)) {
++		while (!sqfs_readdir_nest(dirsp, &dent)) {
+ 			ret = strcmp(dent->name, token_list[j]);
+ 			if (!ret)
+ 				break;
+@@ -533,6 +538,11 @@ static int sqfs_search_dir(struct squashfs_dir_stream *dirs, char **token_list,
+ 
+ 		/* Check for symbolic link and inode type sanity */
+ 		if (get_unaligned_le16(&dir->inode_type) == SQFS_SYMLINK_TYPE) {
++			if (++symlinknest == MAX_SYMLINK_NEST) {
++				ret = -ELOOP;
++				goto out;
++			}
++
+ 			sym = (struct squashfs_symlink_inode *)table;
+ 			/* Get first j + 1 tokens */
+ 			path = sqfs_concat_tokens(token_list, j + 1);
+@@ -880,7 +890,7 @@ out:
+ 	return metablks_count;
+ }
+ 
+-int sqfs_opendir(const char *filename, struct fs_dir_stream **dirsp)
++static int sqfs_opendir_nest(const char *filename, struct fs_dir_stream **dirsp)
+ {
+ 	unsigned char *inode_table = NULL, *dir_table = NULL;
+ 	int j, token_count = 0, ret = 0, metablks_count;
+@@ -975,7 +985,19 @@ out:
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
++int sqfs_opendir(const char *filename, struct fs_dir_stream **dirsp)
++{
++	symlinknest = 0;
++	return sqfs_opendir_nest(filename, dirsp);
++}
++
+ int sqfs_readdir(struct fs_dir_stream *fs_dirs, struct fs_dirent **dentp)
++{
++	symlinknest = 0;
++	return sqfs_readdir_nest(fs_dirs, dentp);
++}
++
++static int sqfs_readdir_nest(struct fs_dir_stream *fs_dirs, struct fs_dirent **dentp)
+ {
+ 	struct squashfs_super_block *sblk = ctxt.sblk;
+ 	struct squashfs_dir_stream *dirs;
+@@ -1319,8 +1341,8 @@ static int sqfs_get_lregfile_info(struct squashfs_lreg_inode *lreg,
+ 	return datablk_count;
+ }
+ 
+-int sqfs_read(const char *filename, void *buf, loff_t offset, loff_t len,
+-	      loff_t *actread)
++static int sqfs_read_nest(const char *filename, void *buf, loff_t offset,
++			  loff_t len, loff_t *actread)
+ {
+ 	char *dir = NULL, *fragment_block, *datablock = NULL;
+ 	char *fragment = NULL, *file = NULL, *resolved, *data;
+@@ -1350,11 +1372,11 @@ int sqfs_read(const char *filename, void *buf, loff_t offset, loff_t len,
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+-	 * sqfs_opendir will uncompress inode and directory tables, and will
++	 * sqfs_opendir_nest will uncompress inode and directory tables, and will
+ 	 * return a pointer to the directory that contains the requested file.
+ 	 */
+ 	sqfs_split_path(&file, &dir, filename);
+-	ret = sqfs_opendir(dir, &dirsp);
++	ret = sqfs_opendir_nest(dir, &dirsp);
+ 	if (ret) {
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -1362,7 +1384,7 @@ int sqfs_read(const char *filename, void *buf, loff_t offset, loff_t len,
+ 	dirs = (struct squashfs_dir_stream *)dirsp;
+ 
+ 	/* For now, only regular files are able to be loaded */
+-	while (!sqfs_readdir(dirsp, &dent)) {
++	while (!sqfs_readdir_nest(dirsp, &dent)) {
+ 		ret = strcmp(dent->name, file);
+ 		if (!ret)
+ 			break;
+@@ -1411,9 +1433,14 @@ int sqfs_read(const char *filename, void *buf, loff_t offset, loff_t len,
+ 		break;
+ 	case SQFS_SYMLINK_TYPE:
+ 	case SQFS_LSYMLINK_TYPE:
++		if (++symlinknest == MAX_SYMLINK_NEST) {
++			ret = -ELOOP;
++			goto out;
++		}
++
+ 		symlink = (struct squashfs_symlink_inode *)ipos;
+ 		resolved = sqfs_resolve_symlink(symlink, filename);
+-		ret = sqfs_read(resolved, buf, offset, len, actread);
++		ret = sqfs_read_nest(resolved, buf, offset, len, actread);
+ 		free(resolved);
+ 		goto out;
+ 	case SQFS_BLKDEV_TYPE:
+@@ -1584,7 +1611,14 @@ out:
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-int sqfs_size(const char *filename, loff_t *size)
++int sqfs_read(const char *filename, void *buf, loff_t offset, loff_t len,
++	      loff_t *actread)
++{
++	symlinknest = 0;
++	return sqfs_read_nest(filename, buf, offset, len, actread);
++}
++
++static int sqfs_size_nest(const char *filename, loff_t *size)
+ {
+ 	struct squashfs_super_block *sblk = ctxt.sblk;
+ 	struct squashfs_symlink_inode *symlink;
+@@ -1600,10 +1634,10 @@ int sqfs_size(const char *filename, loff_t *size)
+ 
+ 	sqfs_split_path(&file, &dir, filename);
+ 	/*
+-	 * sqfs_opendir will uncompress inode and directory tables, and will
++	 * sqfs_opendir_nest will uncompress inode and directory tables, and will
+ 	 * return a pointer to the directory that contains the requested file.
+ 	 */
+-	ret = sqfs_opendir(dir, &dirsp);
++	ret = sqfs_opendir_nest(dir, &dirsp);
+ 	if (ret) {
+ 		ret = -EINVAL;
+ 		goto free_strings;
+@@ -1611,7 +1645,7 @@ int sqfs_size(const char *filename, loff_t *size)
+ 
+ 	dirs = (struct squashfs_dir_stream *)dirsp;
+ 
+-	while (!sqfs_readdir(dirsp, &dent)) {
++	while (!sqfs_readdir_nest(dirsp, &dent)) {
+ 		ret = strcmp(dent->name, file);
+ 		if (!ret)
+ 			break;
+@@ -1644,6 +1678,11 @@ int sqfs_size(const char *filename, loff_t *size)
+ 		break;
+ 	case SQFS_SYMLINK_TYPE:
+ 	case SQFS_LSYMLINK_TYPE:
++		if (++symlinknest == MAX_SYMLINK_NEST) {
++			*size = 0;
++			return -ELOOP;
++		}
++
+ 		symlink = (struct squashfs_symlink_inode *)ipos;
+ 		resolved = sqfs_resolve_symlink(symlink, filename);
+ 		ret = sqfs_size(resolved, size);
+@@ -1683,10 +1722,11 @@ int sqfs_exists(const char *filename)
+ 
+ 	sqfs_split_path(&file, &dir, filename);
+ 	/*
+-	 * sqfs_opendir will uncompress inode and directory tables, and will
++	 * sqfs_opendir_nest will uncompress inode and directory tables, and will
+ 	 * return a pointer to the directory that contains the requested file.
+ 	 */
+-	ret = sqfs_opendir(dir, &dirsp);
++	symlinknest = 0;
++	ret = sqfs_opendir_nest(dir, &dirsp);
+ 	if (ret) {
+ 		ret = -EINVAL;
+ 		goto free_strings;
+@@ -1694,7 +1734,7 @@ int sqfs_exists(const char *filename)
+ 
+ 	dirs = (struct squashfs_dir_stream *)dirsp;
+ 
+-	while (!sqfs_readdir(dirsp, &dent)) {
++	while (!sqfs_readdir_nest(dirsp, &dent)) {
+ 		ret = strcmp(dent->name, file);
+ 		if (!ret)
+ 			break;
+@@ -1711,6 +1751,12 @@ free_strings:
+ 	return ret == 0;
+ }
+ 
++int sqfs_size(const char *filename, loff_t *size)
++{
++	symlinknest = 0;
++	return sqfs_size_nest(filename, size);
++}
++
+ void sqfs_close(void)
+ {
+ 	sqfs_decompressor_cleanup(&ctxt);
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

sources/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2024-57258-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 50ab41c3628dedeca1a331dd86dd203b73faea74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2024 12:08:45 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 5/8] dlmalloc: Fix integer overflow in sbrk()
+
+Make sure that the new break is within mem_malloc_start
+and mem_malloc_end before making progress.
+ulong new = old + increment; can overflow for extremely large
+increment values and memset() can get wrongly called.
+
+Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-57258
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/0a10b49206a29b4aa2f80233a3e53ca0466bb0b3]
+Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
+---
+ common/dlmalloc.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/dlmalloc.c b/common/dlmalloc.c
+index de3f0422..bae2a27c 100644
+--- a/common/dlmalloc.c
++++ b/common/dlmalloc.c
+@@ -591,6 +591,9 @@ void *sbrk(ptrdiff_t increment)
+ 	ulong old = mem_malloc_brk;
+ 	ulong new = old + increment;
+ 
++	if ((new < mem_malloc_start) || (new > mem_malloc_end))
++		return (void *)MORECORE_FAILURE;
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * if we are giving memory back make sure we clear it out since
+ 	 * we set MORECORE_CLEARS to 1
+@@ -598,9 +601,6 @@ void *sbrk(ptrdiff_t increment)
+ 	if (increment < 0)
+ 		memset((void *)new, 0, -increment);
+ 
+-	if ((new < mem_malloc_start) || (new > mem_malloc_end))
+-		return (void *)MORECORE_FAILURE;
+-
+ 	mem_malloc_brk = new;
+ 
+ 	return (void *)old;
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

sources/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2024-57258-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From db7c626204f488a802a2e58b7a788b11fde6be7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2024 12:08:44 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 6/8] dlmalloc: Fix integer overflow in request2size()
+
+req is of type size_t, casting it to long opens the door
+for an integer overflow.
+Values between LONG_MAX - (SIZE_SZ + MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK) - 1 and LONG_MAX
+cause and overflow such that request2size() returns MINSIZE.
+
+Fix by removing the cast.
+The origin of the cast is unclear, it's in u-boot and ppcboot since ever
+and predates the CVS history.
+Doug Lea's original dlmalloc implementation also doesn't have it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-57258
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/8642b2178d2c4002c99a0b69a845a48f2ae2706f]
+Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
+---
+ common/dlmalloc.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/dlmalloc.c b/common/dlmalloc.c
+index bae2a27c..1ac4ee9f 100644
+--- a/common/dlmalloc.c
++++ b/common/dlmalloc.c
+@@ -379,8 +379,8 @@ nextchunk-> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ /* pad request bytes into a usable size */
+ 
+ #define request2size(req) \
+- (((long)((req) + (SIZE_SZ + MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK)) < \
+-  (long)(MINSIZE + MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK)) ? MINSIZE : \
++ ((((req) + (SIZE_SZ + MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK)) < \
++  (MINSIZE + MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK)) ? MINSIZE : \
+    (((req) + (SIZE_SZ + MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK)) & ~(MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK)))
+ 
+ /* Check if m has acceptable alignment */
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

sources/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2024-57258-3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From 37095a204127b60b5e00c4c5d435d6e48a6a1c51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2024 12:08:43 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 7/8] x86: Fix ptrdiff_t for x86_64
+
+sbrk() assumes ptrdiff_t is large enough to enlarge/shrink the heap
+by LONG_MIN/LONG_MAX.
+So, use the long type, also to match the rest of the Linux ecosystem.
+
+Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-57258
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/c17b2a05dd50a3ba437e6373093a0d6a359cdee0]
+Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/posix_types.h | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/posix_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/posix_types.h
+index dbcea7f4..e1ed9bca 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/posix_types.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/posix_types.h
+@@ -20,11 +20,12 @@ typedef unsigned short	__kernel_gid_t;
+ #if defined(__x86_64__)
+ typedef unsigned long	__kernel_size_t;
+ typedef long		__kernel_ssize_t;
++typedef long		__kernel_ptrdiff_t;
+ #else
+ typedef unsigned int	__kernel_size_t;
+ typedef int		__kernel_ssize_t;
+-#endif
+ typedef int		__kernel_ptrdiff_t;
++#endif
+ typedef long		__kernel_time_t;
+ typedef long		__kernel_suseconds_t;
+ typedef long		__kernel_clock_t;
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

sources/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2024-57259.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 2c08fe306c6cbc60ec4beb434c71e56bb7abb678 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2024 22:05:09 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 8/8] squashfs: Fix heap corruption in sqfs_search_dir()
+
+res needs to be large enough to store both strings rem and target,
+plus the path separator and the terminator.
+Currently the space for the path separator is not accounted, so
+the heap is corrupted by one byte.
+
+Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Reviewed-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-57259
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/048d795bb5b3d9c5701b4855f5e74bcf6849bf5e]
+Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
+---
+ fs/squashfs/sqfs.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fs/squashfs/sqfs.c b/fs/squashfs/sqfs.c
+index a5b7890e..1bd9b2a4 100644
+--- a/fs/squashfs/sqfs.c
++++ b/fs/squashfs/sqfs.c
+@@ -563,8 +563,11 @@ static int sqfs_search_dir(struct squashfs_dir_stream *dirs, char **token_list,
+ 				ret = -ENOMEM;
+ 				goto out;
+ 			}
+-			/* Concatenate remaining tokens and symlink's target */
+-			res = malloc(strlen(rem) + strlen(target) + 1);
++			/*
++			 * Concatenate remaining tokens and symlink's target.
++			 * Allocate enough space for rem, target, '/' and '\0'.
++			 */
++			res = malloc(strlen(rem) + strlen(target) + 2);
+ 			if (!res) {
+ 				ret = -ENOMEM;
+ 				goto out;
+-- 
+2.34.1
+